The objective of this paper is to gauge the extent to which Chinese state-owned commercial banks are converging with international best banking and corporate governance practices, with a particular focus on the policy of international listing given its recent popularity. Drawing on the international listings of China's stateowned banks on the Hong Kong stock market, the paper finds that formal convergence is possible to achieve. More difficult to achieve is substantive convergence. In general the findings suggest that the domestic institutional framework still matters, but what may matter more is that banks have the autonomy to integrate best-practices in a manner consistent with domestic conditions. Key Words: Corporate Governance, Banks, China, Hong Kong, International Listing JEL: G21; G38, O16; O19, P31. 
Introduction
The importance of good corporate governance in banks is well-known (e.g. Levine, 2003 , Arun & Turner, 2004 . The importance attached by China to establishing a formal institutional structure for better corporate governance in state-owned commercial banks, is therefore part of a wider system of good governance required for efficient economic performance, even within a modern communist state. The objective in improving governance should be to enable banks to make decisions solely based on commercial consideration without the interference of political interests (Hope & Hu, 2006) . The corporate governance literature suggests successful reform is dependent on the legal protection of shareholders (La Porta et al, 2000) , a functioning prudential regulatory system (Arun & Turner, 2004) , and various levels of foreign competition (Arun & Turner, 2004; Hope & Hu, 2006) . Therefore attempts by many developing economies to develop better corporate governance practices are likely to be constrained by weak domestic institutions, even if they operate or have listings in more advanced economies with higher levels of legal protections (e.g. Black, 2001 ). This is particularly relevant for China, where large state-owned commercial banks have implicitly used international listing on Hong Kong's stock market as a mechanism to integrate international best-practices. An interesting question therefore concerns whether developing economies like China can lever on the institutions of more developed economies to develop better corporate governance practices, even in the absence of domestic institutional convergence?
The objective of this paper is to gauge the extent to which Chinese state-owned commercial banks are converging with international best banking and corporate practices, with a particular focus on the policy of international listing given its recent popularity. Using the OECD Corporate Governance Principles and Basel Core Principles as benchmarks of best practice, the focus of the paper is on whether in the absence of full domestic convergence, banks could use Hong Kong's institutional framework as a means of converging with international best practice. Generally the paper finds evidence that international listing has brought large state banks much closer to international practices. Focusing on the case of the Bank of China Hong Kong (BOCHK), a Chinese state-owned bank with a long history of international exposure, the paper suggests that formal convergence is indeed possible, but that substantive convergence is much more difficult to achieve. Formal convergence refers to regulatory compliance while substantive convergence depends much more on the integrity of 1 directors and their supervisors. The case of the BOCHK illustrates that although it operated in a comparatively advanced banking sector, its corporate governance practices, management and size were often more comparable to mainland state banks. This implies that ultimately the domestic governance framework matters (Black, 2001 ), but that international listing can act as a catalyst for inducing better corporate governance over time. In this sense, what may matter more is that China's banks integrate best practises in a manner that is consistent with domestic institutions.
The following sections examine whether restructuring and international listing have brought China's state banks closer to international best-standards using the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the Basel Committee Core Principles as benchmarks of best practice. Section two outlines the analytical framework focusing on the extent to which international listing can bring banks closer to best practice. It outlines the background to the international listings of China's banks generally. Section three focuses more specifically the case of BOCHK. This includes an analysis of the corporate governance framework, minority shareholder interests, the Shanghai loan scandal, disclosure and transparency, prudential regulation and the board of directors.
Section four discusses the extent to which formal and substantive convergence has been achieved. Section five concludes.
Analytical benchmarks and international listing
A discussion of governance practices cannot take place in terms of absolutes.
There is no single, unified system of governance that is expected, accepted and implemented worldwide. In fact recent research has confirmed the existence of a wide variety of ownership and control structures (Hansman, 1996; Sun, 2003) . Governance practices differ across markets and while there is a general consensus that some practices are better than others, variation occurs even amongst jurisdictions that are seen to be following similar practices. Given this variation, there is extensive discussion as to how markets across the world are interacting. In accordance with this view, the OECD has issued a set of Corporate Governance Principles, which are viewed as recommendations of best practice to enterprises and governments of all countries regarding governance practices. Similarly, in the wake of the increasing global nature of the world's banking system and the threats of international financial instability, the Basel Committee on banking supervision has drawn up core principles of international best banking practices. In order to look at the corporate governance practices adopted by newly internationally listed Chinese banks in a more structured manner, we adopt a two-stage analytical approach using both the OECD's Principles and the more sector specific governance requirements of the Basel banking framework. Taken together these frameworks provided a comprehensive benchmark of international best-practices.
Analytical benchmarks
Drawing on the approach of Madera & Sun (2005) we first use the OECD principles as an analytical prism. The Principles, the latest version of which came in 2004, comprise of six basic principles of corporate governance, and provide a basic standard against which practices of listed companies can be benchmarked. The six principles call upon a company to ensure the following:
(1) A basis for an effective corporate governance framework; (2) the rights of shareholders; (3) the equitable treatment of shareholders; (4) the role of stakeholders in corporate governance; (5) suitable levels of disclosure and transparency and (6) the fulfilment of responsibility by the board of directors What is important to understand about the OECD principles is that they represent a compromise between member countries on what constitutes best practices. Different countries will undoubtedly attach different levels of importance to different principles. In our analysis the major emphasis will be on establishing whether an effective framework exists; whether a Hong Kong listing can better protect minority shareholders and other stakeholders; whether listing can induce a higher level of transparency; and, whether it makes the directors more accountable for their actions? Secondly, we look at the Basel Committee core principles on banking supervision, specifically those relating to corporate governance. The Basel Committee comprises of senior representatives from central banks and supervisory authorities in developed economies including the UK, US, France, Germany and Switzerland. The Basel committee has a long history of promoting the objective of better banking supervision through improved transparency and effective market discipline. This commitment is reflected in the committees Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (The Basel Core Principles) originally published in 1997 and revised in 2006. These comprise of 25 principles, which can be broadly categorised into seven groups: Objectives (including independence, transparency and cooperation); licensing and structure; prudential regulation; ongoing supervision; accounting and disclosure; powers of supervisors; and cross-border supervision (Table 1) . Since the Core Principles represent a complex set of compliance demands on banks and whose full assessment is beyond the scope of this paper, our purpose is to examine the extent to which China's banks are achieving compliance with the general spirit of the principles.
We focus on the areas of most relevance to the Mainland banking sector including transparency, prudential regulation, risk-management practices, remedial action and cross-border enforcement.
(Insert Table 1 here)
International listing and China's banking sector
Given the severe problems facing China's banking sector, a key question concerned how to integrate better corporate governance practices? Feinerman (2007) argues that there must be an incentive to change, be it access to cheaper capital or reduced interference from government or political agencies. Chinese banks that list in Hong Kong are required to abide by the Hong Kong Listing Rules. However, Hong Kong's Corporate Governance Code is based on the "comply or explain" principle typically associated with the UK, and carries no requirement of conformity. Therefore although listing may achieve some formal improvements, the essence of good corporate governance goes beyond mere regulatory compliance. It concerns doing the right thing not because the rules or law says so or because someone is watching, but because it is right (Feinerman, 2007) . Such substantive commitments to good governance practices are better measured against the OECD principles and international best-banking practices.
As a major listing destination, the Hong Kong stock exchange (HKSE) provides an ideal environment for Chinese firms hoping to attain higher standards of governance.
Hong Kong has one of the highest standards of corporate governance in Asia, second only to Singapore (CLSA, 2004 However these listings also induced important changes. CCB became the first of the "Big-Four" mainland banks to appoint a foreign independent director in advance of its IPO. 5 Preparation for listing has also resulted in a greater focus on financial returns. It is worth noting that international listing may not be the key inducement mechanism for this type of disclosure as many of the smaller commercial state banks now provide this ratio. This suggests that there may be a general desire to converge with international best practice. It is however reasonable to suggest that its disclosure is the minimum required for an international listed bank. In the next section we examine the more specific question of how and to what extent these changes can lead to a convergence with international best-practices, not just in terms of corporate governance but also sector specific best-practices.
(Insert Table 4 here)
The BOCKH, international listing and convergence
Although not many Chinese state banks operate on a major scale in international markets, one well known exception is the BOCHK, the Hong Kong-based subsidiary of the BOC Group. The BOC was somewhat unusual in that unlike other large statecommercial banks, it had a long history of operation in advanced market economies. As 
The corporate Governance framework for state-owned banks
It is important to note that although the BOCHK had a long history of operating The CBRC has received legal backing to take over the regulatory and supervisory functions of the PBOC. 10 The PBOC will focus on setting interest rate levels, reserve and liquidity ratios as well as issuing guidelines on credit expansion.
Both the CBRC and the PBOC have gone about their functions in a proactive manner.
One bank director reported that "at every board meeting, the CBRC guy is right there taking notes and pounding the table". 11 The PBOC has issued a set of liquidity ratios similar to central banks in developed economies. In January 2004, the CBRC began phasing out the four-tier loan classification system in favour of the internationally accepted five-tier classification. In March 2004 it announced measures aimed at improving disclosure and transparency in the reporting of NPLs, non-credit assets and off-balance-sheet business. 12 This laying out of regulations is essentially the first step in the development of a healthy banking system; the second is their implementation and enforcement.
A major aspect of regulatory enforcement in banking concerns achieving effective monetary transmission, i.e. implementing monetary policies at the micro-level.
Rapid economic development in developing economies like China tends to create many incentives for expanding output through investment, but few measures for making borrowers bear the full cost of investing inefficiently (McKinnon, 1991) . Many banks have yet to shed their bureaucratic-oriented mentality and their business objectives tend to be more motivated by personal promotion than profit maximisation. 13 Although the PBOC practices strong control over the interest rate, the adoption in 2004 of a 0.9-1.7
percentage point floating range has allowed the banks some scope to price loan risk.
This requires banks to establish credit rating models based on historical data, calculate risk premiums and financing periods. One critical weakness acknowledged by the PBOC is that years of interest rate controls have given banks little or no market-based experience of loan pricing. 14 Podpiera (2006) finds that although credit expansion has slowed, the pricing of risk remains undifferentiated and banks do not appear to take account of enterprise profitability when making loans. Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor of the PBOC, has acknowledged that monetary transmission will remain a problem and "only when agencies at the micro level put in place risk control and capital constraint, could monetary policy transmission mechanism work". 
Rights of shareholders and stakeholders
The previous section indicates that the state as the majority shareholder enjoys significant power. It also points to weak risk-management practices, limited experience with pricing credit under market conditions and poor disclosure. In terms of stakeholders it suggests that the stakeholders that mattered were large state industrial enterprises. Other stakeholders such as private enterprises, small borrowers and depositors were of limited concern. Taken together these unsurprisingly suggest that China's banks, even when listed abroad, may fall short of the international standards simply because they are constrained by a weak domestic framework.
Given the strong ties between Chinese banks and the state, the question remains as to whether these political connections result in a diminished accountability to minority shareholders and other stakeholders. Preparation for the BOCHK's IPO in Hong Kong induced significant restructuring, including consolidation of the Bank's Hong Kong operations and the institution of a centralised management function. As stated in the listing prospectus, the bank focused on its desire to institute stronger governance practices and more stringent risk controls (p. 51). It also came with a commitment for a change in corporate culture. The listing prospectus makes specific reference to maximizing shareholder value (p.52). Although there has been a continued move towards improved practices in China, the explicit statement regarding maximization of shareholder value in an industry previously the bastion of state ownership, can be viewed as an acknowledgement of the change in culture at the bank.
In practice this change was reflected in the reform of the bank's corporate structure, its changing governance practices, and the increasing emphasis on financial returns. The delineation between control and management was made clearer, and more effective risk management processes were put into effect. In addition to the once-off standardisation of governance induced by listing, the decision to list on a developed stock exchange ensured that the Bank would be subject to continuous external monitoring through both the market share price and regulatory authorities, not to mention a vigilant Hong Kong media. Any lack of compliance can be immediately reflected in the market share price. The increasing emphasis on shareholder value is also reflected in the real efficiency improvements achieved by the bank (Table 5 ). The bank achieved consistent improvements in returns, something Chinese banks have found difficult to achieve. It improved labour productivity as measured by profits per employee, benefiting from a reduction in the overlapping of functions. It also achieved a reduction in the level of classified loans. In addition, the bank has maintained a capital adequacy ratio comparable to international standards.
(Insert Table 5 Although not specifically breaking any laws, the practice of making loans with shares as collateral, went against international best practices. Moreover, the BOCHK had vowed that such practices were a thing of the past, The bank responded by reassuring investors that the scandal would not adversely affect profitability. It also claimed that its audit committee had carried out a review of the loan and that it was granted in accordance with the bank's credit risk management policies and procedures. 22 The slow response of the bank not only contravened Hong
Kong's regulations on timely disclosure, but was also a breach of investor trust.
Standard and Poors, a leading international credit ratings agency, revised its BBB-plus long-term counterparty rating from stable to negative, based on concerns over the bank's credit approval process. 23 As a result of numerous other downgrades and negative coverage, the share price started to lag the index of Hang Seng financials.
24
After it became apparent that Mr. Liu was subject to a formal investigation by authorities in Beijing, the BOCHK announced that it would carry out a more thorough investigation into its internal risk-management and credit approval procedures. 25 This investigation would involve a special committee chaired by an international adviser with the power to engage external advisors and auditors. The investigation would go beyond the Shanghai loan and would examine much broader lending practices. The bank carried out discussions with the HKMA over how best to conduct the investigation.
The bank agreed to carry out an interim audit and a special review of lending practices (by an independent auditor). This was almost a re-run off the initial due-diligence process. This was not required by the HKMA or HKSE, but represented a voluntary commitment by the bank in response to market concern.
Disclosure and transparency
As one of Hong Kong's three note-issuing banks, the BOCHK was under particular pressure to be transparent. The IPO process put the reputation of the bank on the line. The overlooking of any aspect of the due-diligence process could have caused huge public embarrassment to the bank. Indeed the uncovering of poor disclosure practice post-IPO did prove very embarrassing for the reputation of the bank, not just in terms of media coverage, but also in terms of its business reputation. In addition a review of the bank's operations revealed that although it complied with Hong Kong's regulations, its application was inconsistent, further suggesting that the essence of good governance is in doing the right thing, even when no one is looking.
One of the transparency problems associated with the Mainland-banking sector is the inconsistent application of loan classification criteria. As part of the preparations for its IPO, auditors carried out a thorough examination of the bank's loan portfolio.
This placed emphasis on China related loans greater than HK$20 million, loans that had recently been restructured and the loan classification system. The audit found that although the bank complied with the HKMA's guidelines on loan classification, the implementation of these guidelines was inconsistent. In response, the BOCHK further defined the way in which it classified loans beyond what was required by the HKMA.
The IPO process indirectly allowed the bank to improve loan classification across the newly consolidated group of banks. Prior to the IPO, Hong Kong banks within the BOC group competed with each other to make loans. A borrower could default on one bank but continue to repay the others. As a consequence, the application of loan classification criteria tended to be inconsistent. The process of related or connected party transaction has been made somewhat more transparent by the listing regulations of the Hong Kong stock market. These require that all connected party transactions above a certain value must be disclosed to the stock exchange and voted upon by minority shareholders. The connected parties are not allowed vote. For the BOCHK this means that any transactions or asset transfers above a certain value need to be disclosed and approved by minority shareholders.
Prudential regulation, risk management and remedial action
The effectiveness of prudential regulation is at the centre of the Basel framework and is also a major part of the corporate governance framework outlined by the OECD.
Principle Seven of Basel outlines that supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place a comprehensive risk management process appropriate to the size and complexity of operation. Principles Eight and Nine deal with the processes to manage credit-risk and asset quality, while Principle 17 focuses on how supervisors must be satisfied with internal audit and control structure. Principle 23 focuses on the remedial action of supervisors. We have already seen that there are many weaknesses in China's domestic system of prudential regulation. In theory these should be mitigated by international listing. In practice, the Shanghai loan scandal showed that while international listing can induce greater transparency, the granting of the loan highlighted serious deficiencies in risk management and raised questions regarding the remedial action available. 
Risk management
In terms of the approval of the Shanghai loan, it appears that political considerations were placed above the economic functions of screening and monitoring. The abrupt resignation of two deputy chief executives in August 2004 was surrounded in similar uncertainty. Two of the banks deputy chief executives, Mr. Zhu
Chi and Mr. Ding Yanshang, were suspended and transferred to Beijing to be investigated by local authorities for allegedly misappropriating shareholders funds for personal purposes. 33 The fraud was alleged to have taken place prior to the Bank's IPO in 2002. The big question for shareholders was why it took the bank so long to uncover the scandal. Unfortunately for shareholders, there were few answers to these questions.
Again the handling of the case illustrated a clear gap between the level of accountability investors in a developed market expect from a bank such as the BOCHK and the tradeoffs faced by the mainland in converging towards better corporate governance.
Board of directors -responsibility and independence
The OECD principles emphasise the accountability, independence, and transparency of the board of directors. Principle Three of Basel suggests that the licensing process should include an assessment of the propriety of Board members and the governance structure. This demand has the potential to create significant difficulty for state-owned banks whose long history in the state bureaucracy imply that they are more accountable to political authorities than market shareholders. In addition bank management tend to be drawn from a small pool of closely connected directors. While there is strong evidence to support this view, the experience of the BOCHK listing also suggests that despite the above constraints, there is evidence that directors are increasingly aware of market perceptions. A significant influence in this change is the role of independent foreign directors. As such, while a dual system of governance may be inevitable in the short term, the case of the BOCHK suggests that directors are likely to become increasingly accountable to the market for their actions.
The BOCHK listing prospectus indicates that regardless of implementation, there was an effort to adopt certain principles of better governance. The BOCHK's board consists of 13 members, six of which are non-executive directors, one is an executive director and the remaining six are made up of independent non-executive directors (INEDs). The inclusion of independent directors is seen as a means of providing independent oversight and minority shareholder protection and the bank has its own policy director independence, which it believes is more stringent than HKSE requirements.
Not only did the BOCHK appoint a comparatively large number of independent directors, but it also gave them unprecedented levels of responsibility. After the revelations of wrong-doing by senior members of management in 2003, independent directors were given a "free hand" to examine the risk management procedures of the bank. In June 2003, the Bank announced the formation of a special committee consisting of two independent directors and an international-banking expert, to undertake a comprehensive review of the credit approval processes and risk management and internal control mechanism of the Bank. 34 Giving "outsiders" free scope to examine and report on internal management and risk control issues was unprecedented in China's banking sector. The Bank has also drawn on "outsider" 
Adaptation: efforts, achievements and shortfalls
In examining the extent to which Chinese banks are converging with international best banking and corporate governance practices, much of the focus revolved around whether, in the absence of full domestic convergence, banks could use Hong Kong's institutional framework as a means of achieving convergence. The case of the BOCHK suggests that formal convergence is indeed possible in terms of listing and capital requirements, general regulatory compliance and board structure. More difficult to achieve is a substantive convergence. These concern areas such as risk-management and remedial action, which ultimately depend on the integrity of directors and their supervisors. While these finding are consistent with the literature emphasising the domestic governance framework (e.g. Black, 2001) , neither can the important elements of convergence, be overlooked. This section discusses the achievements of international listing, its limitations, and the challenges remaining.
On a formal level, the increased emphasis on shareholder value has brought the BOCHK much closer to its Hong Kong counterparts and further distanced it from the conventional concept of a state-run bank. Table 6 indicates that across a range of performance indicators, the BOCHK is now more comparable to its large Hong Kong competitors such as HSBC, than its mainland counterparts. Indeed comparing its current performance to that prior to its IPO when it was more comparable to the other Mainland state banks (see Table 5 ), it is clear that international listing has provided a powerful inducement for change at the bank.
(Insert Table 6 here)
Similarly, the eagerness of the BOCHK and other state-owned commercial banks to learn from and integrate international best practice became more urgent as a result of the unearthing of weak management practices. The BOCHK argue that their attitude since listing has been to do the right thing at all costs. 38 This underpinned the decision to carry out a thorough audit of lending practices after the Shanghai loan revelations. For the "Beijing" directors this has involved a steep learning curve in market discipline. Even allowing for constraints in the institutional framework, the bank notes that the directors of state banks have a strong incentive to be professional, as good compliance puts directors in a good light.
Yet, one of the limitations of international listings is that although it puts in place a strong monitoring mechanism to enforce commitment, it cannot completely prevent management from behaving opportunistically.
"…Despite reforms, government officials will still act unreasonably…adopting best practices can make life easier for directors"
39
What it does achieve is that it allows directors a good excuse for not engaging in corrupt practices. The uncovering of corrupt practices post-listing in the BOCHK suggest that despite the commitment to better practices, management still enjoy a limited degree of discretion and are constrained by weaknesses in the domestic corporate governance framework.
What is interesting about the problems faced in China, particularly in the area of board independence, is how they differ conceptually from governance problems in developed economies. Control over appointments ultimately ensures that banks are accountable to their major shareholder -the state. Similarly, while Feinerman (2007, p. 610) argues that China has much progress to achieve in terms of executive compensation procedures, evidence from the BOCHK suggests that compensation is not an issue particularly when compared to the levels of salaries earned by the directors of Hong Kong's major banks.
One could conceivably argue that the remuneration structures in place are consistent with that of a state-owned bank.
A more pressing problem therefore is not so much whether remuneration has been brought into line with international standards, but rather whether or not Chinese banks have the autonomy to implement best-practices in a way that are consistent with domestic conditions. The financial returns of China's state banks, although improving, are still well-short of international levels. To this extent domestic conditions still matter.
Vice-Premier Huang Ju noted that banking supervisors need to learn from best international practices so as to explore a route of supervision that complies with both China's real conditions and international norms. 41 The CBRC for its part has made the adoption of international best practice a priority, particularly in the case of the BOC and CCB, with both banks regarded as pilot experiments in best practices. 
Conclusions
This study has shown that while domestic institutional structures matter, international listing can mitigate many of the constraints to best practice in China's state banking sector by not only imposing a more consistent set of rules, but also providing the incentives for convergence. However, the disciplining effect of international listing cannot be taken as a given. It must be accompanied by a substantive firm-specific commitment to integrating better practice. International listing is not a substitute for real improvements, but must form part of an integrated approach to realising the professional competencies of management.
In the case of the BOCHK initial revelations of poor practice as part of preparation for the IPO showed that although the bank's management had a long history of operating to international standards, there still existed a considerable mismatch between these experiences and what the Hong Kong market demanded. Compliance with the disclosure requirements of the HKSE and the disciplines of the market that followed, were undoubtedly significant learning experiences for the bank's directors.
This, along with the improvements achieved in other state banks suggests that international listing and the exposure to international standards can act as a powerful incentive for integrating best-practices. Yet, it is significant that many of the BOCHK management practices were similar to those of Mainland banks. It is therefore possible that international listing can achieve a level of international best practice in China's banks. Interestingly the BOCHK sees no reason why the restructuring it achieved cannot be repeated in other state banks.
However, it acknowledges that for this to happen, there must be a wholehearted commitment by the board of directors and the parent company to adopting international standards. A senior executive at the bank noted that "it is one thing to pay lip service and tick the boxes, but it is another thing for the board at the parent company to allow them (the listed company) room and the authority to function". Source: Fitch (2006 Fitch ( , 2007 
